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The Placement of the Discussions  
In the first quarter of the 21st century, China and Brazil have emerged on the international scene 
as proactive players in international relations. Both countries have an interest in participating 
more actively in shaping the international order via a coalition of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa). The BRICS as a group has come to play an important role on 
the global political scene, as they have coordinated foreign policy positions on key issues in 
different international institutions that provide direction to different aspects of global and 
regional governance. In this sense, the BRICS may be interpreted as a sort of “balancing 
coalition.” Often, the BRICS constituent is seen as one the main challenging forces to Western 
powers in international negotiations. At the same time, the BRICS as a group – as well as 
individual BRICS countries – have taken initiatives to establish new institutions led by 
themselves, such as the New Development Bank (the BRICS Bank) and the China-led Asian 
Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), etc. Since 2009, they have also been engaged in yearly summits 
that, apart from focusing on coordinating their voice within international institutions, also 
focuses on intra-BRICS cooperation.  
The rapid global attention on the BRICS was closely followed by the world financial 
crisis in 2008 with the decline of the hegemonic dominance of the US-led world order. The rise 
of emerging powers has successfully penetrated into some power areas in terms of economic 
competition, capital accumulation, political and economic influence, as well as technical and 
material capacities. China, in particular, is performing outstandingly in terms of its global share 
of high-tech manufacturing products, financial competitiveness, as well as international aid and 
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overseas investment. China’s economic success is putting China in a more positive structural 
position both in terms of the production and distribution of global wealth. 
However, after almost a decade since the birth of the “BRICS” acronym, what is the 
situation today? The economic condition of Brazil is particularly discouraging. The Brazilian 
economy is heavily reliant on commodity exports, and it went into recession (South Africa has 
a similar situation). The Russian economy has also depended on oil exports for many years, and 
in recent years it has suffered due to collapsing oil prices. The Ukraine crisis turned Russia-
West relations back to the Cold War. Due to a devaluation in currency and Western sanctions 
restricting its trade, Russia is experiencing its worst recession in six years. India’s economic 
growth is far from robust or sustainable, the country still has a high level of unemployment, and 
it suffers from comprehensive poverty and backward infrastructure.  
The BRICS has great importance for China. The growth of the BRICS’ international 
relevance can multiply the strength of Chinese diplomacy and intensify its path of extensive 
international insertion. On the other hand, the BRICS has a particular significance for Brazil: it 
comprises four of the country's main partners, all of which have strong regional leadership and 
growing participation in the global economy. Thus, the BRICS has the possibility of expanding 
its international presence, seeking higher support and involvement in the construction of a less 
exclusive global governance. 
China’s relationship with Brazil is distinctly different from that of the other BRICS 
members, especially Russia and India, which have suffered from historical and political 
difficulties. Brazil is the largest developing nation in the Western hemisphere, and there is no 
fundamental problem that is rooted in historical conflict, security threats or territorial disputes 
in the relationship between the two countries. Brazil was the first Latin American nation to 
foster a comprehensive strategic partnership with China. In relation to the BRICS, both 
countries, driven by their own motivations and within their own conditions, act in the same 
space and seek greater international insertion, but in different ways and with different 
expectations. Among the existing mechanisms, the institutionalisation of the BRICS is 
presented as a coordinated and integrated possibility for the two countries to participate in 
shaping the international order without the constraints imposed by the Bretton Woods system. 
Both countries have boosted their strategic collaboration on important international issues and 
in dealing with global challenges, such as climate change and the international financial crisis, 
as well as to advocate for the interests of developing nations. 
China’s capital and production outward expansion represents the capitalist world 
system’s new round of capital and production relocation, which will dialectically enlarge or 
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reduce the “room for manoeuvring” and increase or decrease “upward mobility” for developing 
countries, including Brazil.  “Room for manoeuvre” refers to the conducive external conditions 
for internal “upward mobility,” i.e. a favourable external environment or opportunity that leads 
to an internal driving force for modernisation and technological upgrading. The rise of China 
does present a dual effort for semi-periphery and periphery countries – the coexistence of 
opportunities and constraints. Currently, we are witnessing a dual phenomenon in China-Brazil 
relations. 
On the one hand, China and Brazil have cooperated in several international multilateral 
platforms such as the United Nations, BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), the 
BRICS, and the G20. This was essentially because closer ties with Beijing would enable Brazil 
to fulfil its ambition of establishing a multipolar world order, instituting a developing country 
coalition in chief multilateral institutions, promoting South-South cooperation, and enhancing 
the country’s autonomy in international politics. There is a clear economic complementarity 
between the two economies. Brazil’s vast natural resources are very important to China’s 
economy and China has long been the key importer of Brazilian primary and agricultural food 
products. China-Brazil trade relations are becoming more and more important to Brazil, 
bringing many benefits to the country, particularly in the areas of commodities such as iron ore 
and soybeans, a similar situation to many other developing countries that have benefited from 
China’s rapid growth of demand for primary products and rising world prices. 
On the other hand, the “unequal exchange of trade” between the two countries, with China 
exporting manufactured products and Brazil exporting commodities and raw material, is seen 
by many critics as causing a “primarisation” of Brazilian exports and a “deindustrialization” of 
its economy, generating negative impacts to Brazil’s long-term economic development. The 
argument is that China’s competition breaks down the relative monopoly of the existing semi-
peripheral states in certain global commodity chains and causes a certain degree of 
deindustrialization or peripheralisation of many existing semi-periphery countries due to the 
change of their position from being an exporter of manufactured goods to being a commodity 
supplier. In the case of Brazil, the country has been hard-hit by the economic slowdown and 
economic restructuring in China, as well as by the global drop in commodity prices over the 
past few years.  
 
The Continuous Debate and the Contributions by this Special Issue 
On the issue of the BRICS, much of the current debate is centred around the question of whether 
this alliance is really a “historical bloc” that is based on not only benefits and opportunities, but 
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also on shared beliefs, values, and visions, or whether it is just a “marriage of convenience” 
that is based on cost-benefit calculations and issue-based political support. Taking the political 
realm for example, while China and Russia are permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council, they have maintained an unsupportive attitude towards the G4 nations (Brazil, 
India, Germany, and Japan) in their struggle for permanent membership in the Security Council, 
and two of them are BRICS countries. This is seen as a clear mismatch with the typical “South-
South” cooperation and “win-win” relationship that China propagates. 
While recognizing the fact that China’s ties with other member nations in the BRICS 
group has been the subject of much deliberation, the country’s strategic partnership with Brazil 
is still an under-discussed issue. The objective of this special issue aims to contribute to the on-
going debate on some of the central issues in economic, political, and international realms of 
China-Brazil relations. Among these issues, the nature of China-Brazil economic relations is of 
frequent deliberation. Unlike the official rhetoric, the economic relationship between the two 
countries seemingly follows a “North-South” pattern shaped by the “unequal exchange” 
mechanism as termed by dependency theory. 
Given these asymmetries in the China-Brazil relationship, we foresee formidable 
challenges to their policy makers and analysts alike in the years to come. The Chinese idiomatic 
proverb “sleeping in the same bed while having different dreams” suggests a situation in which 
China and Brazil have shared the same space but have different expectations than each side 
wishes as a result of institutional integration. “Riding a tiger” is another Chinese idiomatic 
expression with dialectical implications – “being empowered by riding on the back of a tiger 
while finding it too dangerous to try to get off.” The nexus between the two proverbs points to 
the conundrum that different dreams will lead to a dangerous deadlock. This special issue 
attempts to disseminate critical contributions on the roles of Brazil and China in the BRICS as 
leverage for their actions, and as an agency within the international system. The definition of 
both countries being “emerging powers” does not provide a holistic framework for capturing 
all the nuances of the relationship. The different contributions included in this special issue 
intend to promote mutual understanding by covering different analyses of the China-Brazil 
relationship, and on the way China and Brazil have been affected by and have reacted to 
globalisation, the capitalist world system, and the interactions of international political 
economy, as well as the challenges, contradictions, and opportunities in their relationship faced 
by the two countries. 
In the analysis made by Ramos et al. (in this issue), the BRICS, as an institutional 
arrangement, was marked by the results derived from the G-20. Supported by a qualitative 
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analysis of the documents produced by the Summits, the authors seek to analyse the institutional 
densification processes in the areas of international political economy and international 
security, and their respective path dependence mechanisms. The authors note that the 10-year 
celebration does not set the best context. Brazil still faces a severe political and economic crisis, 
while China goes through the uncertainties stemming from a deceleration process. Regarding 
the theme of institutional densification, Ramos et al. established that: “(i) issues of international 
security are increasingly occupying a prominent place at the summit”; and (ii) Brazil, since the 
coup d’état in 2016, has lost ground as a proposer in the BRICS’ economic agenda, while China 
maintains its attention in the created financial institutions.    
  Fernanda Martins (in this issue), takes into account “the initiatives that have emerged 
within the BRICS grouping regarding global financial governance and considers the possible 
impact of these institutions.” Martins notes that “Brazil and China are very different countries 
even though both are part of the BRICS and share common interests regarding the promotion 
of development and greater influence for developing countries over decision-making 
processes.” In her article, she differentiates between China’s and Brazil’s positions concerning 
“the new financial institutions in order to assess how each one might influence them and benefit 
from them.” Martins argues that “China will most likely benefit the most from these new 
institutions and have increasing influence over them, while Brazil will most likely have a more 
marginal role due to recent domestic developments that have shifted the country’s perception 
of priorities.” Also, she argues that, “while China has a clear plan of engagement in international 
financial governance ranging from new sources of credit for development to the 
internationalization of its national currency in detriment of the dollar, Brazil seems to not have 
such a clear agenda of its interests for international financial governance besides increasing 
developing countries influence over decision-making processes”.  
It can be observed that the articles by Ramos et al. and Martins carry out comparative 
analyses of the positions of China and Brazil regarding the institutional basis derived from the 
BRICS. Issues such as security and the maturation of financial institutions and financial 
mechanisms of governance are among the most relevant to the institutional agenda. And since 
the institutionalization of the group in Yekaterinburg, 2009, we can see that China has had a 
more active role than Brazil in both issues.  
Diego Magalhães (in this issue), goes deeper into the issue of the relationship between 
China and Brazil. Magalhães points out that, in this relationship, China is globalizing Brazil. 
His article aims to analyse how China is globalizing the Brazilian economy, comparing this 
case with how the UK and the US did it in the past. Considering contemporary literature and a 
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comparative data analysis, Magalhães’ conclusions are: (i) “China is about to become the 
central vector of economic globalization in Brazil”; (ii) “Brazil-China bilateral trade and 
investment patterns resembled Brazil-UK relations in the 19th century”; (iii) “transnational 
corporations from developed economies in China strongly affect the Brazil-China trade 
matrix”; and (iv) “political negotiations between Beijing and Brasilia influence the prospect of 
Chinese investments in infrastructure and manufacturing in Brazil”. 
Some of the conclusions from Diego Magalhães' article raise an alert for the Brazilian 
economy. The precocious deindustrialisation process that has been occurring in Brazil, due to 
the sum of domestic variables and international events – such as the more significant Chinese 
presence in productive and financial activities in Brazil – has increased in recent years. 
Associated with the absence of an industrial policy (with a close relationship to the exchange 
rate, taxation, and real interest rate), the increase in Chinese participation in Latin American 
markets and its growing activity in Brazilian economic activity creates a complex puzzle for 
Brazilian policy makers and decision makers.  
Concerning the question of security and defence, Medeiros et al. (in this issue), argue 
that Brazil and China are partners in the debate about defence spending and infrastructure 
investments as an asset for development. The authors consider Brazil and China as developing 
countries that deal with “basic challenges such as social inequality, technological impediments, 
high international trade dependence.” They see both of them wishing to “become self-sufficient 
societies, with high-level employment and strong national industries; and both are also 
dependent on natural resources whose security is unstable and compromising.” Medeiros et al. 
(in this issue) assert that “Brazilian’s oil industry, its hydric potential, and biodiversity are 
elements which require the attention of the state,” and they argue that “the same situation is true 
with China, a country highly dependent on imports from natural resources which demand 
energy supply infrastructure”. To observe and analyse the relationship between Brazil and 
China, they try to “outline how the Chinese and the Brazilian governments understand their 
national development henceforth their defence investments and status.” This analysis is done 
through a reading of the field’s documents and a dialogue with the literature related to the 
theme. From this point, the authors seek to make a comparison of the policies put into practice 
by Brazil and China. The result is, in the view of the authors, that despite the existence of the 
BRICS as an institutional umbrella, relations regarding investment in infrastructure and specific 
sectors tend to move towards bilateral relations between Brazil and China.  
It is not easy to define the position of Brazil and China either in their bilateral relations 
or the construction of a governance agenda within the scope of the BRICS. Although it is 
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possible to verify similar objectives, recent political actions and the politico-economic 
scenarios of Brazil and China encourage a better deal in their positions on the international 
scene. Their role in building a common governance agenda and agency is influenced by the 
specific circumstances of each country. It seems right to question how much the BRICS matter 
to Brazil and China, just as it is appropriate to seek an understanding of how the BRICS affects 
the posture of each of these countries in the scenario of greater interdependence, especially in 
the direction Brazilian-Chinese. 
In a way, this is the issue contemplated in the articles by Hurel & Santoro (in this issue) 
and the article by Xavier et al. (in this issue). Hurel & Santoro draw a comparative analysis 
between China and Brazil in the negotiations on global Internet governance. Their goal is “to 
determine if Brazil and China can cooperate on a common agenda in the BRICS concerning 
Internet governance, in spite of big differences on this issue – in areas such as freedom of 
expression and protection of privacy.” Hurel & Santoro take into account the active position of 
Brazil and China in resistance and opposition to US dominance. Brazil and China disagree with 
the US view that the UN system is an ideal space for Internet governance debates. And, at this 
point, Hurel & Santoro's conclusion points to the existence of qualified cooperation between 
Brazil and China. 
Still considering the possibility and existence of cooperation between Brazil and China 
in specific agenda items, Xavier et al. (in this issue), work with two questions: (i) is it possible 
to infer that the BRICS has boosted energy cooperation between Brazil and China? and, (ii) if 
so, how did it happen? Xavier et al. analyse the statements from the eight summits promoted 
under the BRICS (2009-2016) and the thirty-four-energy related bilateral international acts 
promoted among BRICS countries between 1994 and 2015. Therefore, the BRICS is considered 
as a multilateral forum with the potential to leverage energy cooperation among its members. 
Then, could the BRICS have served as a platform for negotiation and political-diplomatic 
articulation in the sense that it influenced the expansion of the number of initiatives and 
agreements between those countries concerning energy issues? Xavier et al. found that, “while 
bilateral energy relations between Brazil and Russia, and India and South Africa, respectively, 
have undergone subtle changes during this period, Brazil-China energy relations underwent an 
enlargement concerning scope and complexity.” The authors suggest that the “BRICS provided 
an especially cooperative environment for these two countries in the energy sector, although 
[they] cannot infer causality.” 
